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Abstract 
We consider a wireless information surveillance in UAV network, where a legitimate unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 
proactively eavesdrops communication between two suspiciousUAVs. However, challenges arise due to lossy 
airborne channels and limited power of the UAV. In this paper, we study an emerging legitimate eavesdropping 
paradigm that the legitimateUAV improves the eavesdropping performance via jamming the suspicious 
communication. Moreover, a power efficient legitimate eavesdropping scheme, PELE, is proposed to maximize the 
number of eavesdropped packets from the legitimate UAV while maintaining a target signal to interference plus 
noise ratio at the suspicious link. Numerical results are shown to validate the performance of PELE. Additionally, 
four typical fading channel models are applied to the network so as to investigate their impact on PELE. 
 
PELE: Power Efficient Legitimate Eavesdropping
via Jamming in UAV Communications
Xiaoming Wang∗,§, Kai Li†, Salil S. Kanhere‡, Demin Li∗, Xiaolu Zhang∗, and Eduardo Tovar†
∗College of Information Science and Technology, Donghua University, China
§Earthquake Administration of Shanghai Municipality, China
Email: wangyoucao78@163.com, deminli@dhu.edu.cn(corresponding author), xiaoludhu@126.com
†CISTER Research Unit, Portugal
Email: {kaili,emt}@isep.ipp.pt
‡School of Computer Science and Engineering, The University of New South Wales, Australia
Email: salil@cse.unsw.edu.au
Abstract—We consider a wireless information surveillance in
UAV network, where a legitimate unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
proactively eavesdrops communication between two suspicious
UAVs. However, challenges arise due to lossy airborne channels
and limited power of the UAV. In this paper, we study an
emerging legitimate eavesdropping paradigm that the legitimate
UAV improves the eavesdropping performance via jamming the
suspicious communication. Moreover, a power efficient legitimate
eavesdropping scheme, PELE, is proposed to maximize the
number of eavesdropped packets from the legitimate UAV while
maintaining a target signal to interference plus noise ratio at
the suspicious link. Numerical results are shown to validate the
performance of PELE. Additionally, four typical fading channel
models are applied to the network so as to investigate their impact
on PELE.
Index Terms—UAV, Power Efficiency, Eavesdropping, Jamming
I. INTRODUCTION
Thanks to recent technological advances, many types of
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), more popularly known as
drones, are being widely used in complex real world environ-
ments [1, 2]. The recent availability of cost-effective UAVs
has considerably promoted its use in wireless surveillance
for homeland defence [3, 4]. These existing works related to
security and attack modelling arise from a broader national
security perspective and mostly, addresses eavesdropping as il-
legitimate attacks. However, with the rapid popularity of UAVs
in the consumer market, criminals or terrorists can potentially
use them to establish wireless communication for committing
crimes and terrorism [5, 6]. Therefore, there is a growing need
for government agencies to legitimately monitor and eavesdrop
wireless communications of suspicious UAVs [7]. In particular,
we consider a surveillance scenario as shown in Fig. 1. A
surveilling UAV, i.e., UAVL, aims to eavesdrop a point-to-
point wireless communication from a suspicious transmitter
UAV (UAVST ) to a suspicious receiver (UAVSR). UAVST
controls its communication rate over the channel to maintain
a target outage probability at UAVSR. UAVL can successfully
eavesdrop suspicious link only when its achievable data rate
is no smaller than suspicious communication rate. UAVL
is assumed to fly at a predetermined trajectory toward two
suspicious UAVs, establishing a wireless eavesdropping link
(between UAVST and UAVL) and a jamming link (between
UAVL and UAVSR). Moreover, UAVST and UAVSR are
assumed to fly following a collision-free formation flight,
where they keep a prescribed relative distance and angle.
The problem of reliably eavesdropping suspicious transmission
is not trivial. Several critical challenges arise in such a
surveillance scenario. First, the quality of eavesdropping and
jamming links fluctuate over time due to the motion of UAVL
relative to the suspicious UAVs. It is therefore critical to
control the jamming power of UAVL according to the varying
fading channel to eavesdrop efficiently. Second, jamming the
suspicious transmission decreases the achievable data rate at
the suspicious link, which in turn improves the eavesdropping
rate at UAVL. However, sending jamming signals without
an efficient power allocation results in draining energy of
UAVL due to limited battery capacity of the UAV. Third, the
achievable data rate at UAVL is required to be no smaller than
that at UAVST so that the packets generated by UAVST can
be eavesdropped successfully.
In this paper, we aim to maximise the eavesdropping rate
at UAVL via optimising its jamming power. Specifically,
given the constraint of suspicious data rate, we formulate
an optimisation problem for finding the optimal jamming
power at UAVL to maximise the eavesdropping rate, which is
polynomially solvable. Moreover, a power-efficient legitimate
eavesdropping (PELE) scheme is proposed to facilitate the
simultaneous eavesdropping and jamming for UAVL on the
flight, which also derives the optimal jamming power by using
linear programming.
In particular, PELE cognitively controls the jamming power
over the lossy channel under the limited jamming power
constraint. Furthermore, we apply four fading models, i.e.,
Rayleigh, Ricean, Weibull, and Nakagami, to the wireless
links in order to validate the impact of fading states on the
performance of PELE.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section II
presents the related work on security techniques in mobile ad-
hoc networks. We discuss the network model in Section III.
In Section IV, we formulate the optimal jamming problem,
Fig. 1: Legitimate eavesdropping via jamming scenario.
and present the power efficient jamming scheme. Simulation
results are shown in Section V, followed by a conclusion in
Section VI.
II. RELATED WORKS
Some existing works focus on communication security as
wireless networks are prone to malicious attacks. Physical
layer security is recolonized as a promising approach to protect
the communications confidentiality against eavesdroppers [8].
The method imposes different challenges in terms of key
exchange and distribution, especially in the current trend
of dynamic network configurations such as wireless sensor
networks and ad-hoc networks. A theoretical communication
scheme is presented to use multiple antennas to generate
artificial noise to degrade the channel quality of eavesdroppers
[9]. In [10], a low-density parity-check protocol is presented to
achieve communication rates close to the fundamental security
limits in wireless communications. The novel protocol uses a
four step procedure to ensure wireless information-theoretic
security: (i) common randomness via opportunistic transmis-
sion; (ii) message reconciliation; (iii) common key generation
via privacy amplification; and (iv) message protection with
a secret key. The authors in [11] introduce an idea of using
the abstraction of a virtual array of physical arrays to provide
security against eavesdropping. They solve the problem that
using smart antennas at higher layers for security with an
intelligent consideration of MAC and security issues. However,
none of these works [9–11] consider the use of proactive
eavesdropping to enhance network security.
Jamming the eavesdropper is an emerging approach to
enhance the quality of secure wireless transmissions [12–15].
In [12], a cooperative jamming scheme is studied to help a
legitimate user improve its data rate via sending jamming
signal to eavesdropper. They study the power allocations for
the transmitting and jamming users, and show that significant
rate gains may be achieved when the eavesdropper has much
higher SNR than the receivers. In [13], a self-protection
scheme is developed to transmit the jamming signal to degrade
the channel of eavesdropper. Using the proposed full-duplex
scheme, the system is shown to be no longer interference-
limited, in contrast to the half-duplex case. In [14], a hybrid
artificial fast fading scheme is proposed to investigate the
power allocation problem for passive eavesdropper. With this
scheme, the eavesdropper will face a noncoherent Ricean
TABLE I: List of fundamental variables that have been used
Variables Descriptions
PL(x) Legitimate monitor jamming power at time slot x
γe(x) SNR of eavesdropping link at time slot x
γs(x) SNR of suspicious link at time slot x
K1,K2 Two constants relating to the channel
N0 Power of white Gaussian noise
d1(x) Distance between UAVL and UAVST at time slot x
d2(x) Distance between UAVL and UAVSR at time slot x
Pmax
L
Maximum jamming power of UAVL
n Gaussian random number
α1, α2 Path-loss exponent of wireless channel
λ
Coefficient considered to adjust the weights of
the autocorrelated component and independent component
δ SINR/SNR threshold
ρ(x) Adaptive modulation and coding (AMC) rate at time slot x
ǫ The required instantaneous bit error rate
fading single-input-ultiple-output channel, which achieves bet-
ter secrecy performance. A joint cooperative beamforming,
jamming and power allocation scheme is investigated to im-
prove the security of an amplify-and-forward cooperative relay
network in this correspondence [15]. This scheme addresses
the problem of protecting the data transmissions in half-
duplex communications. However, eavesdropping is taken as
an illegitimate attack in [12–15]. As a result, they target
on decreasing the eavesdropping performance. In general,
there is lack of researches on controlling and legitimately
eavesdropping suspicious wireless communications. A recent
work is studied to fill this gap. In [16], the authors present an
approach to improve the eavesdropping rate. However, [16]
studies the proactive eavesdropping problem in the view of
data rate controlling without considering trajectory variance
between the UAVL and suspicious UAVs.
III. NETWORK MODEL
Without loss of generality, we consider that the suspicious
transmitter (UAVST ) and the receiver (UAVSR) work in an
autonomous formation flight, where the two UAVs fly at a
constant speed, and the distance between them is maintained
as D meters. The legitimate eavesdropper (UAVL) patrols
in a predetermined circular trajectory between UAVST and
UAVSR with a diameter D. Particularly, the wireless link
dynamics that are affected by the distance between UAVL
and the suspicious UAVs are identical on a semi-circle of the
trajectory. As a result, we consider the trajectory of UAVL as
a semi-circle, as shown in Fig. 1, for illustration in this paper.
In fact, our algorithm developed in Section IV is general and
can support other shapes of flight trajectory since we have
considered different fading channels with path loss that is
affected by the distance between hostile UAV pairs, regardless
trajectories of UAVs. Moreover, Table I lists the fundamental
variables that have been used in our system model.
The suspicious communication between UAVST and
UAVSR consists of m number of time slots, and each time
slot is denoted as x. We assume that UAVST communicates
with UAVSR in a TDMA fashion, however, it should be noted
that our method is generalised and thus agnostic of the MAC
protocol in use.
At time slot x, the channel gain Hs(t) in the suspicious
link, i.e., from UAVST to UAVSR, is given by the following
expression [18]
Hs(x) =
λHs(x− 1) + n
√
1− λ2
Dα2
(1)
where λ is the coefficient considered to adjust the weights of
the autocorrelated component and the independent component,
and α2 denotes the path-loss exponent in the suspicious link.
n is a Gaussian random number generated by Additive White
Gaussian Noise (AWGN). For the suspicious communication
link, we define Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio (SINR)
on the jamming link, i.e., between UAVST and UAVSR, at
time slot x as γs(x), which is given by
γs(x) =
√
Hs(x) ·K−12 ln K1ǫ · (2ρ(x) − 1)
N0 + PL(x)
(2)
where PL(x) denotes the jamming power of UAVL at time slot
x. ρ(x) denotes the adaptive modulation and coding (AMC)
rate of the UAVST at time slot x, and the highest mode is
denoted by ρM . K1 and K2 are two constants related to the
channel. N0 denotes the power of white Gaussian noise. ǫ is
the required instantaneous bit error rate.
Likewise, the channel gain in the eavesdropping link, i.e.,
from UAVST to UAVL, at time slot x is given by
He(x) =
λHe(x− 1) + n
√
1− λ2
dα11 (x)
(3)
where n is a Gaussian random number generated by AWGN.
α1 denotes the path-loss exponent. d1(x) is the distance
between UAVL and UAVST at time slot x. Moreover, since
the exact locations of suspicious UAVs are unknown by
UAVL, we present d1(x) and d2(x) based on the angle
variation along the trajectory of UAVL, which is denoted as
θ(x). Given the diameter D, the location of UAVL is known
as (D2 cos θ(x),
D
2 sin θ(x))(θ(x) ∈ [0.π]), d1(x). Therefore,
d1(x) is given by
d1(x) =
√
(
D
2
cos θ(x) +
D
2
)2 + (
D
2
sin θ(x))2
=
√
2D
2
√
1 + cos θ(x)
(4)
and the distance between UAVL and UAVSR, d2(x), is given
by d2(x) =
√
D2 − d21(x). Note that d1(x) and d2(x) can be
also estimated by other ways, e.g., measuring receiving signal
strength, or signal angle of arrival of UAVST or UAVSR.
Due to the relative motion of UAVL to UAVST , the channel
in the eavesdropping link presented here consists of two com-
ponents, namely, an autocorrelated component that relies on
the previous channel condition, and an independent component
that is independent of previous channels. A coefficient λ
is considered to adjust the weights of the two components.
Moreover, λ decreases with the growth of the speed of UAVL.
We define Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) of the eavesdropping
link at time slot x as γe(x), which is
γe(x) =
√
He(x) ·K−12 ln K1ǫ · (2ρ(x) − 1)
N0
(5)
Given γe(x) and the regression model mapping SNR to
Packets Reception Rate (PRR) [19], the PRR of suspicious
data packets eavesdropped by UAVL is denoted by R(x),
which is given by
R(x) = (1− 1
2
exp−β0γe(x)+β1)8(2f−l) (6)
where β0 and β1 are two constants in the regression model.
Moreover, β0 controls the shape of the regression curve and
β1 induces horizontal shifts of the curve. f and l denote frame
size and preamble size of the data packet, respectively.
IV. LEGITIMATE EAVESDROPPING VIA JAMMING
In this section, we first formulate the optimal jamming
problem, which maximises the amount of eavesdropped pack-
ets at the UAVL. Next, we propose PELE, a power efficient
jamming scheme for the legitimate eavesdropping to improve
the eavesdropping rate.
A. Problem Formulation
We consider the wireless communication as shown in Fig. 1,
where UAVL aims to eavesdrop the packet from UAVST via
jamming the suspicious transmission. Based on the notations
in the system model, we formulate the optimization problem
for finding the optimal jamming power to maximize the
eavesdropped packets.
Assume that each suspicious data packet has b bytes.
The amount of data (in bytes) successfully eavesdropped is∑m
x=1 b · R(x) given m time slots. To guarantee that the
legitimate jamming and eavesdropping is undetectable by
the two suspicious UAVs, SINR of the suspicious link has
to be maintained at a certain threshold δ, which presents
γs(x) = δ. Specifically, the modulation of UAVST that is
used to transmit data to UAVSR is 2
ρ(x) Quadrature Am-
plitude Modulation (QAM), where ρ(x) ∈ {1, · · · , ρmax}.
When ρ = 1, the modulation is essentially the Binary Phase
Shift Keying (BPSK). When ρ = 2, the modulation is the
Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (QPSK). ρmax indicates the
number of modulation levels available for rate adaptation.
Constraint 0 ≤
∑
m
x=1
PL(x)
m
≤ PmaxL specifies that the average
jamming power of UAVL during the eavesdropping period is
required to be less than the maximum transmit power of the
UAV, PmaxL .
Then, the formulation of the problem is presented as fol-
lows.
max
PL(x),ρ(x)
m∑
x=1
b ·R(x) (7)
subject to : γs(x) = δ (8)
0 ≤
∑m
x=1 PL(x)
m
≤ PmaxL (9)
1 ≤ ρ(x) ≤ ρmax (10)
Furthermore, in terms of Constraint (8), we have
ρ(x) = log2(
δ2(N0 + PL(t))
Hs(x) ·K−12 ln K1ǫ
+ 1) (11)
which indicates that the modulation level is adapted by
UAVST in terms of the jamming power PL(x) of UAVL.
Specifically, UAVST increases ρ(x) to transmit data with
an increasing PL(x) so that SINR of the suspicious link
at time slot x is maintained at δ. Moreover, considering
Constraint (10), the upper bound and the lower bound of the
jamming power PL(x) can be obtained by
PL(x) =
{
Hs(x)·K
−1
2 ln
K1
ǫ
δ2
−N0, if ρ(x) = 1;
(2ρmax−1)Hs(x)·K
−1
2 ln
K1
ǫ
δ2
−N0, if ρ(x) = ρmax;
(12)
Consequently, by substituting Equations (5), (6) and (11)
into (7), (8) and (10), the optimisation problem is reformulated
as follows.
Optimal Jamming Problem:
max
PL(x)
b ·
m∑
x=1
(1− 1
2
exp
β1−β0δ
√
He(x)
Hs(x)
·(1+
PL(x)
N0
)
)8(2f−l)
subject to : 0 ≤
∑m
x=1 PL(x)
m
≤ PmaxL (13)
PL(x) ≥
Hs(x) ·K−12 ln K1ǫ
δ2
−N0 (14)
PL(x) ≤ 1
δ2
(
(2ρmax − 1)Hs(x)K−12 ln
K1
ǫ
)−N0 (15)
B. PELE Algorithm
The optimal jamming power, P ⋆L(x) in the optimisation
problem is able to be derived by linear optimisation tech-
niques, e.g., linear programming. Next, we propose the PELE
algorithm to allocate jamming power for UAVL in real time.
The algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. Specifically, the
channel gains Hs(x), He(x) and N0 are known by UAVL
at the beginning of time slot x, since UAVL overhears the
channels of suspicious and eavesdropping link via channel
probing [9]. Since γe(x) ≥ δ is required by UAVL to
successfully eavesdrop the suspicious transmission, we have
PL(x) ≥ N0 · (Hs(x)−He(x))
He(x)
(16)
where ρ(x) is given by Equation (11). Therefore, the jamming
power at x = k is initialised as P 0L(k) =
N0·(Hs(x)−He(x))
He(x)
.
Next, P 0L(k) is examined by UAVL if the three constraints
in the optimisation problem are satisfied. Specifically, if one
of the constraint does not hold, it indicates that the required
jamming power is much higher than the optimal solution, i.e.,
the link quality of the eavesdropping link is too low to decode
the suspicious packet. In this case, UAVL does not send the
jamming signal to UAVSR for purpose of power efficiency.
Moreover, if
∑
k−1
x=1
PL(x)+P
0
L(k)
k
≤ PmaxL and Constraints (14)
and (15) hold, the optimisation problem is derived by UAVL,
and the optimal jamming power P ⋆L(x) is obtained.
Algorithm 1 PELE
1: k denotes the current time slot when UAVL sends jam-
ming signal.
2: Initialise: P 0L(k) =
N0·(Hs(x)−He(x))
He(x)
.
3: Input: D,n, λ, α1, α2.
4: UAVL overhears the channels on suspicious and eaves-
dropping links.
5: if
∑
k−1
x=1
PL(x)+P
0
L(k)
k
≤ PmaxL or Hs(x)·K
−1
2 ln
K1
ǫ
δ2
−N0 ≤
P 0L(x) ≤ 1δ2
(
(2ρmax − 1)Hs(x)K−12 ln K1ǫ
)−N0 then
6: derive the Optimal Jamming Problem → P ⋆L(x)
7: else
8: P ⋆L(x) = 0
9: end if
Note that the power consumption of executing PELE is
much smaller than the jamming power of UAVL, which is
negligible. Moreover, the time complexity of PELE is O(m),
which depends on the number of slots. Therefore, PELE
algorithm can be conducted in real time due to the linearity
of the proposed Optimal Jamming Problem.
V. SIMULATION EVALUATION
In this section, we provide numerical results to validate the
performance of our proposed PELE algorithm. Furthermore,
we apply Rayleigh, Ricean, Weibull, and Nakagami channel to
the wireless links, respectively, so as to investigate the impact
of different fading models on PELE algorithm.
A. Simulation Configurations
The distance between the two suspicious UAVs is D, and
the path length of UAVL is π×D/2. The patrolling speed of
UAVL is set to 10m/s. The detailed system-level simulation
parameters are shown in Table II.
UAVST communicates with UAVSR in a TDMA fashion
for suspicious collision-free transmission. Especially, we con-
sider that a TDMA frame contains 7 time slots, and each of
which is 10 seconds long. In one time slot, UAVST transmits
its data to UAVSR, where UAVL eavesdrops and decides to
jam the suspicious communication. In addition, the suspicious
link, eavesdropping link, and jamming link are assumed to be
block-fading, i.e., the channels remain unchanged during each
transmission block, and may change from block to block.
TABLE II: Simulation Parameters
Parameters Values
K1 0.2
K2 3
β0 2.6
β1 1
f 20
l 10
ǫ 0.005
N0 3.98× 10−12W
b 100bytes
δ 3
λ 0.3
α1 3
α2 2.5
n 0.005377
D 1700m
Pmax
L
4× 10−9W
ρmax 8
B. Eavesdropping rate and Power consumption
Without loss of generality, we compare PELE with two le-
gitimate eavesdropping strategies: (i) Proactive eavesdropping
with constant jamming power, where the jamming power is
set to 2 × 10−9W, which is half of the maximum transmit
power of our simulated UAV (In fact, the constant jamming
power can be set to any value below PmaxL , which has
little effects on simulation results as observed in the per-
formance); and (ii) Passive eavesdropping without jamming,
where UAVL passively overhears the packets broadcasted by
UAVST , however, it does not send jamming signal to the
suspicious link [16, 17, 20].
Fig. 2 presents the other two methods with optimal solutions
in terms of the eavesdropping rate. The error bar shows the
standard deviation over 100 runs. PELE outperforms non-
Fig. 2: The amount of eavesdropped packets by UAVL
regarding to different D
Jamming and constant-Jamming schemes by nearly 1.25 and
1.1 times in the number of packets eavesdropped. The reason
is that PELE purposely adapts the jamming power of UAVL
to change the suspicious communication (e.g., to a smaller
data rate) for overhearing more packets. Total eavesdropped
packets nearly reach to the same maximum value (700Bytes)
when D ≤ 600 regardless selection of algorithms. These
results mean that in such a short distance, UAVL can re-
ceive maximum packets from UAVST regardless which AMC
modes UAVST has chosen. With an increase in the diameter
of UAVL’s trajectory, the number of eavesdropped packets
decreases. Resulting from Equation (1), when D increases,
Hs(x) decreases accordingly, so total number of received
packets will decrease.
Fig. 3: Power consumption of UAVL with different D
Fig. 3 shows that PELE algorithm saves 98.5% more power
than the constant-Jamming scheme, when D < 600. When D
of the trajectory increases from 600m to 1400m, the power
consumption of PELE increases. The reason is that the radius
of the semi-circular trajectory of UAVL increases with an
increase of D, regarding to Equation (4). As a result, He(t)
drops. Due to Equation (5) and (11), UAVL consumes higher
jamming power to raise ρ(x) of UAVST so as to maintain
γe(x).
C. Impact of typical fading models
We study the impact of four typical fading channel models,
i.e., Rayleigh, Ricean, Weibull and Nakagami, with a specific
coefficient component that is used to characterise the channel.
In particular, the coefficient component of Rayleigh, Rician,
Weibull, and Nakagami is set to 2, 1, 2, and 0.5, respec-
tively [21]. Fig. 4 shows that the eavesdropping rate achieved
by PELE linearly grows with time in Rayleigh, Ricean and
Weibull fading channels. PELE performs best in Weibull
fading channel, but worst in Nakagami fading channel. Total
received packets in Nakagami fading channel are much less
than in other three channels with different time slots. This is
because Weibull distribution is typically descriptive of channel
fading with a dominant line-of-sight (LOS) propagation, which
leads to a small amount of time the channel remains in a
fade. For Nakagami channel with the coefficient component
of 0.5, the received signal consists of a large number of
noise waves with randomly distributed amplitudes, phase,
and angles of arrival, which causes distortion and fading of
the received signal. In Fig. 5, the eavesdropping rate drops
with an increase of D over the four fading models, which
results from channel gain of the suspicious link decreases.
Weibull fading model achieves the highest eavesdropping rate
while Nakagami model performs the worst. This can also be
interpreted by the the eavesdropping rate regarding to time,
which is shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4: Eavesdropping rate in 1000 time slots when
D = 1700m
Fig. 5: Eavesdropping rate with different fading channels
Fig. 6 presents the power consumption of UAVL with
the four fading models. Specifically, UAVL consumes the
least jamming power in Nakagami model. This is because
Nakagami model leads to a high channel fading, namely, small
eavesdropping rate as observed in Fig. 4. Consequently, the
optimal solution to the proposed Optimal Jamming Problem
is not able to be achieved by PELE in some of the time slots;
therefore, UAVL does not jam the suspicious link in order to
save energy.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered a wireless information surveil-
lance paradigm by investigating a scenario where a legitimate
UAV aims to intercept a wireless communication between two
suspicious UAVs over fading channels. We have formulated
a power-efficient jamming problem for UAVL to eavesdrop
the suspicious transmission with uncertain channel dynamics.
PELE algorithm was proposed to maximise the eavesdropping
rate, which jointly considers jamming power and maintaining
Fig. 6: Power consumption with different fading channels
outage rate of the suspicious link. Numerical results have
shown that PELE outperforms non-Jamming and constant-
Jamming schemes on eavesdropping rate. In addition, the
impact of different fading models are also analysed on PELE.
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